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Abstract  
 
Many economists and policy makers advocate a fundamental shift towards “green growth” as 
the new, qualitatively-different growth paradigm, largely based on enhanced 
material/resource/energy efficiency, structural changes towards a service-dominated 
economy and a switch in the energy mix favouring renewable forms of energy. “Green 
growth” may work well in creating new growth impulses with reduced environmental load and 
facilitating related technological and structural change. But can it also mitigate climate 
change at the required scale (i.e. significant, absolute and permanent decline of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions at global level) and pace (i.e. in no more than two decades)? This 
paper argues that growth, technological, population-expansion and governance constraints 
as well as some key systemic issues cast a very long shadow on the “green growth” hopes. 
One should not deceive oneself into believing that such an evolutionary (and often 
reductionist) approach will be sufficient to cope with the complexities of climate change. It 
may rather give much false hope and excuses to do nothing really fundamental that should 
bring about a U-turn of global GHG emissions. The proponents of a resource efficiency 
revolution, re-structuring of economies and a drastic change in the energy mix need to 
scrutinize the historical evidence, in particular the arithmetic of economic and population 
growth. Furthermore, they need to realize that the required transformation goes far beyond 
innovation and structural changes to include better distribution of income and wealth, 
limitation of market power of economic agents that promote biased approaches to GHG 
reduction, and a culture of sufficiency. Climate change calls into question the global equality 
of opportunity for prosperity (i.e. ecological justice and development space) and is thus a 
huge developmental challenge for all countries, but particularly for the global South and a 
question of life and death for some developing countries.  
 
The author would like to extend particular thanks to Frank Grothaus, Detlef Kotte, Jörg 
Mayer, Chandran Nair and Gunnar Rundgren for their helpful comments for improving the 
manuscript. 
 
Ulrich Hoffmann 
Geneva, June 2015 
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Introduction 
In the run-up to the Rio+20 Conference in June 2012 and the recent UN Climate Summit on 
23 September 2014 virtually everyone (from multilateral agencies to politicians, to 
businessmen, and to NGOs has advocated a fundamental shift towards “green and inclusive 
growth”1 as the new, qualitatively-different growth paradigm,2 which would considerably 
improve the energy efficiency of the economy and lead to drastic changes in its energy and 
material mix (replacing exhaustible by renewable materials), with corresponding structural 
changes.3 “Green growth” advocates argue that such paradigm change would unleash new 
wealth creation and employment opportunities; provided that there was sufficient investment 
and companies had better information and supportive incentives. In other words, the 
impression occurs that the “green growth” concept is flawless, just the enabling conditions for 
it are lacking.4 “Green growth”, which should be rather seen as a process of structural 
change, may indeed create some new growth impulses with reduced environmental load, in 
particular at the micro-economic level. But can it also mitigate climate change at the required 
scale and pace (i.e. significant, absolute and permanent decline of GHG emissions in a 
historically very short period of time) at macro-economic and global level?   
 
The reality check below casts a long shadow on the "green growth" hopes. Our analysis 
argues that the arithmetic of economic and population growth, energy/resource/materiel 
efficiency limits related to the rebound effect (the phenomenon that efficiency increases tend 
to boost, rather than reduce overall energy/resource/material consumption) and horizontal 
shifting of problems, governance and market constraints, as well as systemic limits call into 
question the hopes of de-coupling GHG from economic growth. Rather, one should not 
deceive oneself into believing that such evolutionary (and often reductionist) approach will be 
sufficient to cope with the socio-economic complexities related to climate change (and some 
                                                
1  This should be a combination of smart (based on knowledge and innovation), green (i.e. a more 
resource-efficient and less environmental damaging), and inclusive growth (fostering a high-
employment, social-services and cultural-values centered economy).    
2  As put by Nair (2014), “the truly insidious thing about “inclusive growth” and its partner 
falsehoods (like “green growth” or “carbon neutrality” – added by the author) is that they are 
words of submission being spoken by some of the most powerful people in the world. As with 
other forms of propaganda, feel good phrases and lazy analysis have replaced the need to look 
for solutions and the hard decisions necessary to achieve them.” 
3  Energy efficiency is to a large extent also a function of enhanced material and resource 
efficiency.    
4  For more information, see: UNEP, 2011, pp. 2-3 and The New Climate Economy Report (The 
Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014), published on the eve of the UN 
Climate Summit on 23 September 2014.  
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other global environmental problems, such as loss of biodiversity). "Green growth" may give 
much false hope and excuses to do nothing really fundamental that should bring about a U-
turn of global GHG emissions. The approach is largely reduced to a technocratic and 
technology-fetishized one, because changing technologies is much easier than altering 
societies and their socio-economic drivers.    
 
“Green growth” proponents need to scrutinize the historical macro- (not micro-) economic 
evidence, in particular the arithmetic of economic and population growth, the colossal 
reductions required in the GHG-emission intensity of economic growth as well as the 
significant influence of the rebound effect. Furthermore, they need to realize that the required 
transformation goes far beyond innovation and structural changes to include better 
distribution of income and wealth, limitation of market power of economic agents that 
promote biased approaches to GHG reduction, and a culture of sufficiency.1 Against this very 
background, an attempt is made below to elaborate on the true economics of climate 
change. Global warming also calls into question the global equality of opportunity for 
prosperity (i.e. ecological justice and development space) and is thus a huge developmental 
challenge for all countries, but particularly for the global South and a question of life and 
death for some developing countries. 
Limits set by the arithmetic of economic and population 
growth  
As can be seen from figure 1, in the last few years the fossil-fuel-related CO2-emission 
trajectory has followed a trend that is worse than the worst case scenario (A1Fl - assuming a 
temperature increase of 4oC by the end of this century) used in the 4th assessment report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of 2007.2  If current GHG-emission trends 
continue unabated, according to the 5th IPCC assessment report of 2014, we are likely on 
course to temperature increases of 4-6oC and even more (figure 2),3 which would 
undoubtedly have apocalyptic implications. The 4th IPCC assessment report concluded that 
                                                
1  Conversely, The New Climate Economy Report simplistically purports that “structural and 
technological changes unfolding in the global economy, combined with multiple opportunities to 
improve economic efficiency, now make it possible to achieve both better growth and better 
climate outcomes” (The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014: 15).  
2  For an overview of the six future GHG emission scenarios used in the IPCC IV report, see: 
IPCC, 2007 (a), p.13.  
3  Because of the higher temperature increase over the continents and the polar reinforcement in 
the Northern hemisphere, the regional temperature increase could lead to averages between 6-
10 OC (WBGU, 2014: 20). 
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GHG reductions in the order of 85% for developed countries and some 50% for developing 
countries would be necessary by 2050 to keep global warming at a range of 2 to 2.4oC 
(IPCC, 2007b: 15).   
 
Figure 1: 
Recent trend in fossil-fuel-related CO2 emissions, compared to the future emission scenarios 
used in the IPCC IV report of 2007   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Truhetz (2014). 
Note: The Emissions Scenarios used in the IPCC reports are grouped into four scenario 
families (A1, A2, B1 and B2) that explore alternative development pathways, covering a wide 
range of demographic, economic and technological driving forces and resulting GHG 
emissions. The A1 storyline assumes a world of very rapid economic growth, a global 
population that peaks in mid-century and rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technologies. A1 is divided into three groups that describe alternative directions of 
technological change: fossil intensive (a1FI), non-fossil energy resources (A1T) and a 
balance across all sources (A1B). B1 describes a convergent world, with the same global 
population as A1, but with more rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and 
information economy. B2 describes a world with intermediate population and economic 
growth, emphasizing local solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability. A2 
describes a very heterogeneous world with high population growth, slow economic 
development and slow technological change. 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Change in global annual mean surface temperature relative to 1986-2005, based on the 
representative (GHG) concentration pathways (RCP):     
Limits set by the arithmetic of economic and population growth 
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Source: IPCC, 2014a: 21. 
Note:  RCP 8.5 is the business-as-usual scenario and RCP 2.6 is called “peak and decline” 
pathway, i.e. GHG emissions peak by 2013 and then fall continuously. 
 
As portrayed in figure 3, energy-related carbon emissions increased much stronger in the 
first decade of this century than in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly caused by higher carbon 
intensity of energy generation (notably related to the renaissance of coal in the fuel mix) and 
strong GDP per-capita growth. These factors, in combination with population growth, have 
considerably outpaced the improving energy efficiency of the global economy (though even 
the pace of energy efficiency improvement in the first decade of this century slowed down 
compared to the one in the 1990s). 
 
Figure 3: 
  
 
Source: IPCC, 2014b: 9 
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It is highly questionable whether the required drastic GHG-emission reductions are really 
achievable under the prevailing growth paradigm. By way of illustration, global carbon 
intensity of GDP fell from around 1kg/$ of economic activity to just 770g/$ (i.e. by 23%) 
between 1980 and 2008 (a drop of about 0.7% per annum). Even if the trends of global 
population (at 0.7% per annum) and income growth (at 1.4% per year) of the last few 
decades were just extrapolated to 2050, carbon intensity would have to be reduced to 
36gCO2/$ – a 21-fold improvement on the current global average – to limit global warming to 
2oC. Allowing developing countries to catch up with the present level of GDP per-capita in 
the European Union would even require a much higher drop in global carbon intensity of 
almost 130 times by 2050 (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: 
Development of the Carbon Intensity of GDP, 1980 to 2050 
 
 
 
Source: Jackson (2009: 81) and additions by the author. 
 
Although these estimates and projections, made by Tim Jackson, are already half a decade 
old, more recent analysis of global carbon intensity dynamics by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) (2012, 2013)  as part of its annual Low Carbon Economy Index supports Jackson’s 
projections. According to the PwC experts, carbon intensity of the global economy would 
have to be reduced by 6.2% a year between now and 2050. As can be seen from table 1, 
Limits set by the arithmetic of economic and population growth 
 Can Green Growth Really Work? May 2015, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 10
even a doubling of the current rate of decarbonization would still lead to emissions consistent 
with 6oC of warming by the end of the century.1 
 
Table 1: 
Globally required decarbonization levels and likely temperature increase till 2050  
 
  
Average annual rate of 
global decarbonization to 
2050 
(Per cent) 
Implied concentration 
levels, 
approximate 
(ppm CO2e) 
IPCC “best guess” of 
average global 
temperature increase 
above pre-industrial 
levels, rounded to 
nearest ºC 
1.6 1,200 6 
3.0 750 4 
4.5 550 3 
6.2 450 2 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: 9, 2013:3 and 2014:3. 
 
 
  Not once since World War II has mankind achieved the rate of reduction of carbon intensity 
of GDP required for limiting global warming to 2oC (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: 1). Most 
recently (in 2013), global carbon intensity declined by 1.2 per cent 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014:5). In retrospect, apart from Germany just for a short period 
of two years after reunification in the 1990s, the Russian Federation is the only large 
economy that has reduced emissions substantially since 1990, mostly caused by a 
breakdown of its heavy industry (an example of de-growth). The country’s carbon emissions 
fell by almost 3% annually in 1990–2005. The world (not only a handful of technologically 
                                                
1  The estimates for carbon intensity dynamics by PwC are very conservative and at the lower end 
of the scale, because PwC analysis only considers energy-related carbon emissions. The 
majority of the emissions in agriculture (one of the biggest sources of global GHG emissions) are 
not included. The implications of additional GHG emissions caused by reaching trigger points of 
climate change, such as the thawing of perma-frost areas or the release of carbon from soil (the 
biggest carbon storage reservoir), caused by higher soil temperatures, were also not taken into 
PwC consideration. For more information, see PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: 12. 
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very advanced countries) would have to repeat the Russian experience at a roughly 3 times 
more drastic extent (and even that would only result in limiting global warming to about 3OC). 
The closest the world came to the required decarbonization levels was during the recessions 
of the late 1970s/early 1980s (with almost 5% reduction in 1981) and the late 1990s (with a 
reduction of 4.2% in 1999) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012: 9). This seems to suggest that, 
historically, drastic rates of decarbonization have been linked to recessions and thus phases 
of stagnation or contraction of GDP.  The highest decarbonization rate ever achieved in a 
planned fashion was 4.5 per cent per annum, when France implemented ist nuclear energy 
programme (World Bank, 2015:5). 
 
The rise of global population by about 30%, from 7.2 billion now to about 9.3 billion by 2050, 
will drive the scale effect of production and consumption (i.e. their absolute physical 
expansion). This growth, combined with a three-fold increase in per capita consumption 
(from about US$6,600 to US$19,700) (and even assuming that the rich world would not grow 
any more) would jack up the size of the world economy by four times, requiring 80% more 
energy (OECD, 2012). While it is a fact that (with the exception of some oil-producing Arab 
countries) the countries with the highest population growth have contributed least to GHG 
emissions thus far, this is only because their populations continue to live in extreme poverty. 
In other words, population growth does not matter for resource consumption and GHG 
emissions as long as one accepts that people remain poor, with minimal levels of 
consumption. But it begins to matter a great deal if the international community has the 
ambition to reduce poverty amidst rapidly growing populations (if the 1.5 billion people 
currently without access to basic energy supply obtained that access and had the current 
average per capita CO2 emissions, this would increase global carbon emissions by 20% and 
double those of the developing world) (Pielke, 2010: 221). 
 
It is often also overlooked that the drastic reductions in GHG intensity of GDP have to 
happen in a historically very short period of time, i.e. the next 20-30 years. According to 
McKinsey researchers, the "carbon revolution" needs to be three times faster than industrial 
labour productivity rise in the industrial revolution. "During the Industrial Revolution, the 
United States achieved an increase in labour productivity of ten times between 1830 and 
1955. The key difference is the timeframe. The tenfold increase in labour productivity was 
achieved over 125 years; the carbon revolution" needs to happen in only 2-3 decades” 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2008: 12-13).  
Limits set by the arithmetic of economic and population growth 
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The asymmetry between carbon intensity, scale and structural effect of 
economic growth 
To really come to grips with ballooning GHG emissions, the global economy needs to 
decouple GHG emissions in absolute, not relative terms from GDP growth.1 This absolute 
decoupling needs to be significant, fast, global and permanent.    
 
The relatively modest progress achieved in reducing GHG intensity of GDP is related to the 
fact that technological progress in reducing GHG intensity and concomitant structural change 
have been outpaced by the scale effect of growth. To decouple GHG-emission from GDP 
growth (and thus a qualitatively different economic growth) implies that the technology effect 
and the composition/structural effect of growth, supported by changes in the energy mix lead 
to higher GHG-emission reductions than GHG-emission growth fuelled by the scale effect of 
economic growth (see figure 5). However, there are only very few examples, where such 
decoupling has actually happened, one being the case of refrigerators in some developed 
countries2, another example concerns modern lighting systems.3 Much more typical, 
however, has been the case of fuel efficiency of the privately-owned car population in the 
European Union in the last 20 years, which can be found in many other areas and sectors 
(figure 6).4 Savings through more fuel efficient cars were outweighed by the strong increase 
in the car population and the total mileage travelled.5 Whereas fuel consumption per 
                                                
1  Relative decoupling implies that the growth of GHG emissions is slower than GDP growth, which 
does not check GHG emission growth. The environmental impact of relative decoupling can 
even be negative, if the marginal ecological cost of scarce ecological resources outpaces the 
reduction in ecological input use per unit of GDP (for more information, see Paech, 2012).   
2  Since the 1970s, refrigerators and freezers in the United States, for instance, have increased in 
size by a third, while consuming two-thirds less energy at one-third the price. For more 
information, see: www.c2es.org/technology/factsheet/ResidentialBuildingEnd-Use. It should, 
however, not go without comment that some analysts call into question this progress. They refer 
to the rebound effect (analyzed at greater length below) pointing to the rather impressive 
expansion of general refrigeration dependence in modern agri-food chains, partly also caused by 
changes in consumption patterns in favour of perishable, highly cold-chain dependent foods 
(Garnett, 2011: 28-29).     
3  A significant reduction in energy and material intensity of modern lighting systems is linked to 
three recent developments: (i) the development of new energy efficient lighting equipment; (ii) 
the utilization of improved lighting design practice; and (iii) the improvement in lighting control 
systems. Energy and material efficiency gains are estimated to be in the order of a factor of 4-8, 
caused by drastically lower energy consumption and much longer life time 
(http://energy.gov/energysaver/ articles/led-lighting).  
4  For an overview of the picture in other sectors, such as the building sector, cargo transport and 
air traffic, see Exner et al. (2008: 49-54). 
5   Improvements of fuel efficiency have also been handicapped by increased purchases of so- 
called sport utility vehicles (SUVs), which are 10 to 50% heavier than normal passenger vehicles 
and thus tend to have a higher fuel consumption (estimated at 25% or more). In Germany, the 
Limits set by the arithmetic of economic and population growth 
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privately-owned car decreased by about 15% in the period 1990-2007, car population and 
total mileage travelled increased by over 40%. Consequently, total fuel consumption of 
privately-owned cars rose by more than a quarter.    
 
Figure 5: 
Conceptual underpinnings of a decoupling of GHG emissions from GDP growth  
 
 
Source: Author’s animation. 
 
Figure 6: 
Growth in private car travel versus fuel efficiency in the EU-27, 1990-2007 
 
 
Source: www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/growth-in-private-car-travel.  
                                                                                                                                                     
most sophisticated and technology-driven car market world-wide, SUV registration has recently 
accounted for almost 20% of total passenger car sales, compared to 2-3% at the turn of the 
century (in the US, the market share of SUVs is almost 50%) (Dudenhöffer, 2013). The average 
weight of passenger cars has also increased in the last few decades. The weight of 
Volkswagen’s popular Golf model, for instance, has virtually doubled since its launch in 1974. 
The same is true for the Mini Cooper, now produced by BMW, which increased its weight from 
670kg in 1997 to 1,210kg in 2014 (ADAC, 2014: 25) .       
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Interestingly, structural changes have also been far less effective in countering the scale-
effect-induced GHG-emission dynamics than hoped for. Generally, for restructuring to be 
effective, GHG-intensive sectors and activities would have to shrink faster than the 
expansion of GHG-efficient ones, which actually has not happened. ‘Ecological’ restructuring 
of the economy is a structural change at gigantic dimension and, as pointed out above, 
required at break-neck speed, which implies a huge loss in fixed-capital stock. However, 
unless motivated by a severe economic crisis or rather abrupt changes in demand, 
entrepreneurs tend to gradually replace the fixed-capital stock as a function of amortization 
cycles (that can be influenced by finance and fiscal policy measures of governments).1  
 
Finance capital also plays a key role in ecological restructuring. On the one hand, finance 
capital provides, in addition to reinvested profits, the loan or share capital for required 
changes in the fixed-capital stock, which on its own, puts pressure on productive capital to 
generate profit for paying interest or revenues on shares and thus expand the scale of 
production. On the other hand, finance capital tends to have a rather short-term interest in 
the profitability of its invested capital. At the same time, it is risk averse as regards investing 
in technology for paradigm shifts or revolutionary changes. Hence a preference for 
supporting investment projects, based on evolutionary or incremental changes as regards 
energy (and related material and resource) efficiency and changes in the energy mix, which 
generally fall short of the required quantum-leap changes in a historically short period of 
time. In essence, scale effects, new technology and structural change all require active use 
of external finance capital, which on its own requires profit and underlying economic growth 
to pay interest and revenues on shares.             
 
Also, the structural shift into a service-dominated economy has generated far less GHG-
emission reductions than hoped for. This is caused by the fact that quite a number of service 
sectors, such as transport, health, IT services2 or tourism, are rather fixed-capital and thus 
energy, material and resource intensive when it comes to setting up their infra-structure or 
                                                
1  In a very comprehensive analysis of micro-data for some 50,000 German companies, Petrick 
(2013) concluded that structural change and a cleaner fuel mix, rather than technological 
changes, have driven declining carbon intensity in the German manufacturing industry in recent 
decades. The structural change has however also included outsourcing of energy-intensive 
activities abroad.   
2  According to Schmidt-Bleek (2014: 137 and 169), the ecological rucksack of IT equipment is 
generally ten times as high as for other products … This means that the material intensity of 
information and communication technology is on average 10 times bigger than that of the 
Mercedes-Benz S-class vehicle.  
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operating base (conversely, operationally, most service sectors are labour-intensive).1 What 
is more, emissions of the private consumption of a person are relative to his/her income and 
not the occupation. So, while shifting jobs into the service sector might reduce emissions in 
production somewhat, the people working there will drive their car to work, eat food and go 
on vacation in the same way as a factory worker. Stockbrokers earning a million dollar or 
more probably use little resources at work, but they will use a lot more resources and energy 
for private consumption than workers in manufacturing.2         
Increasing the use of renewable energy – easier said than done  
Much hope is put on the contribution of changes in the energy mix to reducing GHG 
emissions. However, evidence suggests that a complete or significant replacement of fossil 
fuel by renewable energy (RE) is very challenging on a number of fronts: 
▬   There is the need for compacting RE. 
▬ One needs a significantly modified, renewed or new transmission infra-structure. 
▬ There is a reduced energy return on input.  
▬ Certain RE have to face up to material scarcities. 
▬ There is not yet a really sustainable alternative for conventional transport fuel. 
 
Wind and solar, the two most promising RE sources, are variable and intermittent, and 
therefore cannot serve as “base-load” electricity, requiring substantial conventional electricity 
capacity as backup. They also require significant material input into the production of solar 
panels and wind turbines and a major upgrading of storage capacity, transmission lines and 
the creation of intelligent grids, all set to drive up material consumption (and related costs), in 
some cases completely exhausting supply of strategic materials (for more information, see 
Achzet et al., 2011).3 Furthermore, two-thirds of fossil fuel is used as transport fuel, for which 
                                                
1  But even in this regard, there are exceptions. In German on-line commerce, for instance, recent 
analysis suggests that there are more parcels returned from customers to on-line traders after 
purchase than the mailing of parcels among private individuals in the country, causing additional 
transport and fuel consumption (Die Zeit, 3 April 2014).   
2  For more information, see: Alcott, 2012. 
3  Just one illustration: to meet global electricity consumption by (solar) photovoltaic panels in 2030 
would require a consumption of copper of 100–200 million tons; this compares to a recent global 
copper production level of about 15 million tons per annum. Similar scenarios apply to rare 
earths and some heavy metals. What is more, their production is highly environmentally and/or 
socially problematic (Exner et al., 2008: 68, 69, 72). For more information, also see Bleischwitz 
et al. (2012). 
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there is no real substitute within sight (biofuels cannot meet more than a small fraction of the 
world’s transport fuel demand).1 
 
Hänggi (2011) cautions that a change in the energy mix does often not lead to a 
straightforward replacement of fossil by renewable fuel. Rather, the new energy is likely to be 
used in parallel with the old one for quite some time (a phenomenon that applies to many 
social innovations), both for technical reasons, but also linked to the rebound effect (see 
below). For instance, the present global consumption of coal is higher than that before the oil 
age, so is the current consumption of fuel wood compared to what was used before the coal 
age. Also, to assure reliable electricity supply, gas-reliant power stations are likely to play an 
important role in backing up wind and solar power facilities (Röpke and Lippelt, 2011). 
 
It should also not be overlooked that, unlike conventional fuel, renewable energy is usually 
only available in non-concentrated form; it has to be “compacted” to generate sufficient 
power. This “compaction” or, in technical terms, the reduction of entropy of a system2, can 
only be achieved by increasing the entropy in other parts. In practical terms of renewable 
energy, this means that one can only compact wind, solar, bio or hydro energy by increasing 
the use of conventional fuel or raw materials.3 
 
As a result, the Energy Return on Energy Invested (EROEI)4 is low and sometimes even 
negative (in fact, even for conventional fuels the EROEI has dramatically declined in recent 
                                                
1  Estimates of land requirements for biofuels vary widely, but mainly depend on the type of 
feedstock, geographical location, and level of input and yield increase. The massive scale of 
land requirements for meeting biofuel blending targets however poses a serious competitive 
challenge for land for food-crop production. To replace 10 per cent of global transport fuel 
demand by first generation biofuels in 2030 would require the equivalent of no less than 8 to 36 
per cent of current global cropland, including permanent cultures (UNEP, 2009). This contrasts 
with recent estimates that only about 5 per cent of the arable land on the planet remains unused 
(Kluger, 2010: 34–39). Furthermore, a recent study of the Institute for European Environmental 
Policy on the effects of indirect land-use change associated with the increased use of 
conventional biofuels that EU Member States have planned for within their National Renewable 
Energy Action Plans till 2020 (i.e. 10% of consumed transport fuel should come from renewable 
resources – recent discussions suggest a lowering of this share to 5 or 7%) concludes that 
meeting this target would lead to between 80.5 and 167% more GHG emissions than meeting 
the same need through fossil fuel use (Bowyer, 2010). 
2  In classical thermodynamics, the concept of entropy is defined by the second law of 
thermodynamics, which states that the entropy of an isolated system always increases or 
remains constant. Entropy is the unit of measurement for the unavailability of a given volume of 
energy. 
3  For more information, see Sarkar (2009: 316–318) and Rundgren (2012: chapter 6). 
4  There are different methods for calculating EROEI and there is a large range of EROEI values 
for individual energy sources depending on the method used.  
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decades).1 According to Hall et al. (2009: 25–47), it is not important to have renewable 
energy alternatives per se, but that they have: 
 
▬ a sufficient energy density 
▬ an appropriate transportability;  
▬ a relatively low environmental impact per net unit delivered to society;  
▬ a relatively high EROEI; and  
▬ that RE are obtainable on a scale that society demands. 
 
Hall et al. (2009: 25-47) stress that “we must remember that usually what we want is energy 
services, not energy itself, which usually has little intrinsic economic utility”. MacKay (2009: 
103–104) adds that “for a sustainable energy plan to add up, we need both the forms and 
amounts of energy consumption and production to match up. Converting energy from one 
form to another ... usually involves substantial losses of useful energy ... Conversion losses 
(in the United Kingdom, for example – added by the author) account for about 22 per cent of 
total national energy consumption”. 
 
In sum it should be noted that low EREI, losses in storage, transmission and conversion, and 
less efficiency at the point of use for renewable energy can mean that the need for energy 
supply can increase considerably compared to the current fossil fuel dominated energy mix – 
just to keep energy utility at the point of use the same.  
 
The efficiency illusion - the rebound effect 
Enhanced energy (and related material and resource) efficiency and ample availability of 
cheap renewable energy will encourage a “rebound effect”, i.e. physical consumption is likely 
to increase as a result of productivity increases, which leads to lower costs and prices and 
the shifting of thus saved consumer money or investment funds.2  
 
The Rebound Effect was first described by the English economist William Stanley Jevons in 
his book “The Coal Question”, published in 1865. Jevons observed that England’s 
                                                
1  For more information, see Exner et al. (2008: 60–79). 
2  For a more in-depth analysis, see Hoffmann (2011: 4-5). 
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consumption of coal soared after James Watt introduced his coal-fired steam engine, which 
greatly improved the efficiency of Thomas Newcomen’s earlier design. Watt’s innovations 
made coal a more cost-effective power source, leading to the increased use of the steam 
engine in a wide range of industries. This in turn increased total coal consumption, even as 
the amount of coal required for any particular application fell. Jevons argued that 
improvements in fuel efficiency tend to increase, rather than decrease, fuel use: “It is a 
confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished 
consumption. The very contrary is the truth … no one must suppose that coal thus saved is 
spared – it is only saved from one use to be employed in others” (Jevons, 1906).      
 
The Rebound Effect reflects the causality between efficiency increases and additional 
demand. The definition not only includes the energy/material/resource (EMR) efficiency, but 
also the additional demand impact of increased labour and capital productivity.   
 
Besides the financial rebound effect (denoting that part or all of the EMR-efficiency-induced 
cost savings are used for re-investment or additional consumption) there is also a material 
rebound effect. In addition, there are psychological and cross-factor rebound effects. Material 
rebound effects are caused by higher EMR consumption resulting from the need to change 
fixed capital and infra-structure for increasing EMR efficiency. The psychological rebound 
effect provokes higher EMR consumption, because users of more efficient technologies are 
under the impression that they have economized on EMR use and that there is thus no harm 
in using the concerned device a bit more (e.g. the user of a more fuel efficient or electrical 
vehicle increases the mileage). The cross-factor rebound effect, in turn, is triggered by 
enhanced labour productivity, which replaces labour by mechanization and motorization, 
driving material and resource consumption, but in particular energy use. In other words, 
labour productivity increases are bought by reduced energy efficiency. Technological 
developments that besides EMR efficiency also increase the capital efficiency and labour 
productivity are likely to cause ‘backfire effects’, i.e. ultimately increasing EMR demand 
(Santarius, 2012: 17).  
 
There is yet another, more complicated aspect of Jevons’ paradox.1 Even if higher labour 
productivity can make workers redundant, it also increased the remaining workers’ salaries. 
This creates new demands and new employment opportunities. Those that are made 
redundant, in turn, are mostly productive in some other trade. Even if we see a lot of 
                                                
1  For more information, see Rundgren (2013).  
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unemployment globally, one must admit that the enormous gains in productivity have not 
resulted in widespread or mass unemployment. To some extent, workers have reduced their 
work hours, but certainly not at all in parity with the increase of labour productivity. Therefore, 
despite all efficiency improvements our society has neither significantly reduced the number 
of hours worked nor the resources used, not in total and not per capita. Rather, efficiency 
gains have fuelled increased consumption. Against this background, Foster, Clark and York 
(2010) point out that “An economic system devoted to profits, accumulation, and economic 
expansion without end will tend to use any efficiency gains or cost reductions to expand the 
overall scale of production … Conservation in the aggregate is impossible for capitalism, 
however much the output/input ratio may be increased in the engineering of a given product. 
This is because all savings tend to spur further capital formation ….” 
 
Rebound effects have been poorly analyzed so far, with some estimates limited to the 
financial rebound effects. The latter alone are estimated to neutralize up to half of the total 
EMR efficiency gains (Santarius, 2012: 19). Empirical information on material and cross-
factor rebound effects is not yet available. Against this background, it will be simplistic to 
assume that EMR efficiency gains can play the main role in reducing GHG intensity. The key 
dilemma is that efficiency and productivity gains tend to boost economic growth, thus 
ushering in more physical consumption. This is one of the key reasons, which call into 
question the effectiveness of the ‘efficiency revolution’ as a key element in the de-coupling 
strategy at macro-economic and global levels.  
 
Theoretically, some rebound effects could be neutralized by eco-taxes. However, such taxes 
(being increased in line with higher EMR efficiency) would have to be designed in a way that 
does not remove the incentive for efficiency innovation and would also have to be 
coordinated internationally. Setting absolute EMR consumption limits would be more 
promising, for instance in the context of caps for emission/pollution trading schemes. 
However, almost all of such trading schemes on carbon-emission reductions have not been 
very successful so far, the virtual collapse of the EU emission trading scheme in recent years 
is a case in point.1 One should also not overlook the equality challenges of emission trading 
                                                
1  On 24 September 2014, the day that followed the UN Climate Summit 2014, the European 
Parliament’s environment commit voted in favour of giving away free carbon permit allowances – 
equivalent to 5 billion Euro – to a select group of heavy industries in the EU, in an effort to 
discourage them from moving production abroad to countries with lower environmental 
standards. Carbon prices in the European Emission Trading Scheme were at above 30 Euro/t in 
2008, but were just a mere 7 Euro/t in December 2014 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-26/eu-carbon-rises-to-highest-since-march-
as-nations-tackle-glut). While the European Commission plans to reform the current system, 
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schemes and the fact that there is no link between the value of the service in a free market 
and the total cost for society. What is more, even the smartest-designed carbon offset trading 
scheme cannot overcome the constraints set by the above-mentioned limits of the maths of 
decarbonization - as stressed by Pielke (2010: 111), carbon "markets cannot make the 
impossible possible".   
 
Linear thinking and horizontal shifting 
There is also a tendency of too much linear thinking and approaches to enhancing EMR 
efficiency, often resulting in an outcome that only shifts the problem. Some of the technical 
advances for EMR efficiency gains, for instance, rely on material, which is either scarce or 
very energy intensive to produce or difficult to re-use, recycle or safely dispose of. According 
to Bleischwitz et al. (2012: 21), “the upswing for eco-industries in the North may have a dark 
side in the South: resource-rich countries being moved into rapid extraction paths exceeding 
the eco-systems and socio-economic institutions of those regions and fuelling civil wars with 
resource rents”. To use a concrete example, according to Schmidt-Bleek (2014: 65), “the 
damages in nature caused by electrical vehicles are far bigger than the ecological savings 
obtained by lower emissions”.1    
 
A considerable part of GHG intensity drops in developed countries has been achieved not by 
“real physical savings”, but by “outsourcing” very EMR-intensive production to developing 
countries (almost a quarter of GHG emissions related to goods consumed in developed 
countries has been outsourced). A team of scientists at Oxford University, for instance, 
estimated that under a correct account, allowing for imports and exports, Britain’s carbon 
footprint is nearly twice as high as the official figure (i.e. 21 t CO2eq/person/year instead of 
11). The share of CO2 net imports to total carbon emissions of individual developed 
countries has recently ranged from about 15 per cent for Greece to almost 60 per cent for 
Switzerland. (Aichele and Felbermayr, 2011: 13). Against this background, EMR and carbon 
efficiency gains in developed countries need to be scrutinized with care and are often far less 
impressive than appearing at first sight.  
                                                                                                                                                     
analysts predict that carbon prices may not rise to much more than 10 Euro/t by 2020 (ICTSD, 
2014: 13-14).   
1  All too often the mistake is made to calculate ecological gains of new products only based on 
their ecological footprint during the life-time of the concerned product, while ignoring the 
ecological rucksack caused by the material that is used in the production of the new good. As 
regards cars, life-time fuel consumption and related carbon emissions account for only 20 per 
cent of the total ecological impact of a car (Schmidt-Bleek, 2014: 81).     
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Governance and market constraints 
No doubt, the drastic and quick changes required for achieving the unprecedented absolute, 
permanent and global GHG emission reductions necessitate a clear strategic political vision, 
a sound strategy and consistent implementation. Yet, in practice we remain far away from 
that. The climate is changing much faster than the international efforts to address it and the 
political rhetoric does not match the scale and the seriousness of the problem.1 The 
international climate regime, though without alternative, is not providing a coherent and 
sufficiently effective approach yet.2 According to Fatih Birol, the chief economist of IEA, 
“potentially, we are already with our feet in water, reaching the level of our knees. Yet we 
make decisions and keep promising that our toes will remain dry” (cited in Kriener, 2011). 
 
Moreover, the current public debt and financial crisis in numerous Western countries is likely 
to complicate the much required structural and technological change that underpins "green 
growth". Governments in the crisis-stricken developed countries find themselves in a 
budgetary straightjacket, being obliged to drastically cut back public expenses and 
investment in the next few years, increasing deflationary and recessionary tendencies in the 
concerned economies. Most of these countries will be unable to launch big economic 
stimulus or re-structuring packages as done in the wake of the 2008–2009 crisis.3  
 
                                                
1  As pointed out by Schmidt-Bleek, we are in the paradoxical situation that never in history have 
we practiced so much environmental policy as today, yet the extent of environmental damage 
keeps rising (Schmidt-Bleek, 2014: 38).  
2  It is beyond the scope of the analysis in this paper to elaborate on the key issues that delay and 
hamper progress in international climate-change negotiations, particularly in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). The main points of contention in the 
climate negotiations can be summarized in two positioAns, which are far apart: on the one hand, 
the demand of developing countries that the remaining atmospheric space for further economic 
and social development has to be shared on the basis of the use of a carbon budget for future 
emissions and the consideration of carbon debt for past emissions since the industrial revolution. 
This would imply a rather significant financial compensation of developing countries (for a more 
elaborate analysis, see Khor, 2010). On the other hand, there is the position that the 
decarbonization of the economy and the related changes in economic structure and energy mix 
as well as considerable improvements in material/energy/resource efficiency would altogether 
generate more opportunities and ultimately income and jobs than costs (for more information, 
see for instance Hennicke P, 2014).       
3  The level of total public and private investment in EU countries has decreased every year since 
the 2008 crisis and in 2013 was 15% below the investment volume of the pre-crisis level (Die 
Zeit, No. 31, 2014, p. 26).   
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Existing market structures are also complicating the “green” transformation of economies. 
For instance, from a systemic point of view, a considerable part of renewable energy can 
(and should) be deployed in a local, decentralized way, avoiding much of the required 
investment in new grids, avoiding transmission losses and matching supply with demand. 
Yet, the market domination of few energy companies leads to a preference being given to 
central, grid-based approaches that retain their market power (off shore wind parks, nuclear 
energy and project proposals for huge solar power generation facilities, for instance, in the 
Sahara are cases in point).  
 
The externalization of environmental costs and massive subsidization of fossil-fuel 
dependent industries and industrialization approaches have become a fundamental part of 
the capitalist market economy. More generally, there is a systemic problem of free riding of 
“conventional producers” that take advantage of all kinds of “perverse” subsidies and 
misguided incentives. Conversely, sustainable producers, who want to distinguish 
themselves, have to provide (and pay for) the evidence/certification that they are indeed 
meeting specific sustainability criteria (usually partly reflected in public or private 
sustainability standards).  
 
Internalization is a cost-shifting process. Effective policy design, environmental taxes, 
command-and-control instruments and various market mechanisms (including cap-and-trade 
markets) can lead to some internalization. However, as emphasized by Giorgos Kallis, it is 
naïve to think that internalization is just a matter of policy and can be done without significant 
political and social change. Powerful interests will not sit back quietly, accept environmental 
caps and taxes and adapt to economic restructuring. On the contrary, they will use their 
political muscle. Valuation is subjective and thus also subject to power manipulations. Many 
activities that form the core of the current economy would have never come to be if they had 
to pay for their externalities. Properly priced, civil aviation would have come to a halt, and 
there would probably not be many cars on the streets (Kallis, 2011: 878).1 
 
It is often argued that policy instruments, such as eco-taxes, and market-based tools, such 
as cap-and-trade schemes, need to be fully and effectively applied so that GHG emissions 
are properly priced. The European Environment Agency summarized and evaluated the 
effectiveness of the existing policy instruments in the European Union on encouraging 
                                                
1  One should also not overlook the conflicts and complexities in internalization of costs, especially 
for complicated systems, like agriculture. By way of illustration, one can reduce methane 
emissions by culling cows, but then biodiversity of many landscapes will be devastated.  
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changes towards sustainable production and consumption (see table 2 below). The Agency 
came to the sobering conclusion that “overall, current policies are rather incremental than 
transformative” (European Environment Agency, 2010: 46). Carbon-offset markets, for 
instance, are bound to remain far behind GHG-reduction hopes, because the level of ‘caps’ 
is often influenced by pressure of key lobby groups or specific industries that insist on the 
allocation of free-of-charge emission permits. What is more, the rapid increase of renewable 
energy supply capacity and its bearing on notably electricity prices in several European 
countries has put additional downward pressure on permit prices in the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme.1 In any case, the price of carbon would have to be so (very) high 
that drastic de-carbonization of production and consumption becomes a reality.2 As 
mentioned above, this would undoubtedly wipe out quite a number of carbon-intensive 
sectors and would require very pro-active government engagement to smoothen the socio-
economic consequences of such restructuring and make it socially acceptable. All this is 
theoretically possible, but unlikely to happen at global level in the remaining very short period 
of 2-3 decades for drastic decarbonization of the world economy.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Table 2:  Examples of existing policy instruments for encouraging sustainable production and 
consumption in EU member countries       
                                                
1  For more information see:  
www.mckinsey.de/sites/mck_files/files/mckinsey_energiewende -inde_et_september_2014.pdf.  
2  According to one estimate, done by Hänggi, (2011: 261), effective drastic changes in 
conventional-fuel-dominated production and consumption patterns for Switzerland can only be 
expected beyond a level of US$ 270 per tonne of CO2.    
Governance and market constraints 
 Can Green Growth Really Work? May 2015, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 24
Policy instrument  EU level examples  National and local examples  
Economic instruments  Energy Taxation Directive  
Vignettes for Heavy Good 
Vehicles  
The EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme  
Energy and fuel taxes, 
emission-based car taxation, 
water fees, subsidies for 
installation of renewable energy 
systems and energy-saving 
measures in buildings, traffic 
congestion charges, 
deposit-refund schemes  
Regulatory instruments 
and standards  
The EU Ecodesign 
Directive on 
energy-related products, 
several waste-related 
directives aiming at 
enhancing recycling, and 
the EU RoHS Directive.  
Regulatory requirements for 
energy performance of buildings 
(e.g. the German Federal 
Ordinance on Energy Saving)  
Voluntary agreements  The EU Retail Forum, the 
European Food SCP 
Roundtable and the 
Communication on Green 
Public Procurement; the 
EU-Asia partnership on 
Sustainable Consumption 
and Production (SWITCH 
Programme), the 
European Destinations of 
Excellence (EDEN) project 
to promote sustainable 
tourism  
Public-private partnerships, for 
example the Austrian 
Sustainability Seal, the British 
Red/Green Calculator, the 
German Sustainable Retail 
Initiative or the French retailers' 
commitments with regard to 
sustainable development.  
Information-based 
instruments  
The European Ecolabel 
Regulation (including its 
revision), the EU Organic 
food label and the Energy 
Label including its 
extension to more 
products, the Control 
Climate Change 
campaign, and the Buying 
Green Handbook  
Numerous guidelines and portals, 
for example, Topten (Switzerland) 
and topprodukte.at (Austria). 
Campaigns include Love Food, 
Hate Waste (the United 
Kingdom), Et ton mindre 
(Denmark) or Faisons vite, ça 
chauffe Energy Campaign 
(France).  
 
Source: European Environment Agency (2010: 46). 
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Changing consumption patterns - a hard nut to crack 
The colossal de-carbonization of the economy and human life required will only be 
achievable if current consumption patterns, methods and lifestyles are also subject to 
profound change. Yet, far-going and lasting changes will be very difficult to bring about. The 
globalization of unsustainable Western life styles and consumption trends, including the 
tendency towards higher animal protein content of food and the high mobility obtained 
through modern, but carbon-intensive transport systems, will be very hard nuts to crack on 
the consumption front. What is often underestimated by the advocates of “green growth” is 
the fact that changing consumption and concomitant lifestyles need to be understood as a 
social issue, factoring in equity, not just as an environmental issue. Consumption patterns 
are unlikely to significantly change unless income distribution changes as well.1 
 
Only when employment, standard of living and social security are assured and the social rifts 
in society are kept in check will there be sufficient willingness among a majority of the 
population to support changes in lifestyle and an ecological policy that abandons the 
economic growth fetishism and the concomitant increase in income to drastically cut GHG 
emissions.   
 
Systemic limits – the economic growth fetishism 
If the technological, governance and market constraints were not already enough, some 
systemic issues are also calling into question the “green growth” hopes. Their essence is that 
the capitalist economic system cannot operate without growth, with the exception of short 
cyclical crises. “Expand or perish” is an inexorable force and the constant accumulation of 
capital has inherent expansionist features, i.e. all economic agents are under competitive 
pressure to either undercut the costs of their competitors or conquer markets by creating new 
products. Increases in labour productivity and the permanent creation of new consumer 
needs generally lead to more, not less physical production and consumption (i.e. the 
principle of capitalist accumulation).2  
 
                                                
1  No matter whether it concerns the purchase of goods with a certain longevity, organic food or the 
renting of well-insulated flats, consumers will only switch to them if they dispose of a proper 
income.  
2  For a more elaborate analysis, see Hoffmann (2011: 13-16). 
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This increase in growth can bring, but does not necessarily mean, additional benefits to 
society. Capitalist actors are not interested per se in growth of societal benefits, but in sales’ 
increases so that profits rise. As correctly put by Lockwood (2011), “growth is inherent in 
capitalism, which means you can’t have capitalism without growth, and you can’t have a 
capitalist steady state economy”, as advocated by Herman Daly and others. Rather, under 
capitalism, as described by Green (2011), “growth is like a bicycle – if it stops, you fall off”.  
 
This is the reason why economic growth is fetishized by virtually all policy makers and 
analysts – a tool or the way becomes the ultimate end, just to make sure that there is 
sufficient income generation to plaster the inherent social and ecological cracks of the 
capitalist system.  
 
“Green growth” naively postulates that technological progress and structural change would 
be sufficient to uncouple economic from GHG and resources/material/energy consumption 
growth, without questioning the existing asymmetrical market structures, related supply-chain 
governance, social problems and economic driving forces. Dematerialized growth remains an 
illusion under the prevailing capitalist accumulation imperative. Without changes in income-
distribution and culture related to consumption behavior, the required fundamental 
transformation will remain illusory. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that there are 
natural-science and technical limits to growth, which cannot be circumvented by green 
technology alone. According to Tienhaara, “an overemphasis on technology … tends to 
displace solutions to problems that are simple, yet effective, and reinforces the belief that 
changes in lifestyle (or in ways of doing business) are not necessary in order to reduce 
humanity’s impact on the planet” (Tienhaara, 2009: 18). 
 
The mammoth challenge: how can we extricate ourselves 
from the economic growth predicament? 
What the above-developed analysis on the true (socio-) economics of climate change has 
brought to light is that a paradigm shift, rather than a green turn is required.  
 
However, the ongoing and collective ballooning of GHG emissions has squandered the 
opportunities for ‘evolutionary change’ afforded by the earlier 2OC carbon budget. 
Furthermore, a spate of positive practical examples on GHG reduction opportunities and a 
large body of knowledge on the catastrophic consequences of likely temperature increases 
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of 4-6OC and more will not be sufficient to alter the current GHG-intensive, GDP-growth-
fetishizing development paradigm. As emphasized by Chandran Nair, it is also pointless to 
hope that the world’s countries will find a universal notion of responsibility and then act on it. 
The rich nations will not opt to halt or reverse growth while the poor catch up, and, 
conversely, the developing world will not forgo growth while the rich countries try to figure out 
if they can maintain their current lifestyles in a sustainable way (Nair, 2011: 143).  
 
The growth paradigm ignores the fact that in a bio-physically finite system, beyond a certain 
point, marginal growth makes mankind poorer, not richer, because the incremental income 
generated is overtaken by the incremental damage, thus reducing global wealth (if properly 
calculated). As put by Randers, once in overshoot, the sustainable carrying capacity of the 
planet can only be re-established in one way: down. “Either through managed decline, or 
through collapse – leaving it to the market or to nature to reduce human activity” (Randers, 
2013: 10). It thus seems likely that recurrent crises in nature and the economy, which are 
sufficiently large, will be required to bring about the required change. The question is not, 
whether the world economy – in particular the economy of rich Northern countries – has to 
shrink, but how this process will happen: in a chaotic or organized way and how it will end.1  
This is the very background, against which Tim Jackson pointed out that “the climate may 
just turn out to be the mother of all limits” (Jackson, 2009: 13). 
 
Admittedly, this is scary prophetism, to which there are alternative transformative measures 
under what was above-termed “managed decline of the current overshoot”. The questions to 
be posed, however, are: how likely will such measures be harnessed under prevailing power 
relationships; can they really have a sufficiently large impact to move from a growth to a 
post-growth paradigm; and do such transformations not imply very far-going system change? 
 
Three elements seem to be imperative for the required transformation: 
Assurance of consistency so that the development of production and consumption methods 
and related technologies is in harmony with nature (in particular its reproductive capacity). 
Taming the growth paradigm by practicing sufficiency, the collective use, rather than 
individual ownership of products (through the so-called sharing economy),2 a more local and 
social, rather than global focus of the economy, and the realignment of the financial sector 
with the real (material) economy. 
                                                
1  For an elaborate analysis, see Adler and Schachtschneider, 2010: 67.  
2  This would also encourage longevity of products, their re-use, repair and recycling. 
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A better distribution of income both within and between countries (for an elaborate analysis, 
see Unmüßig et al. 2012). Essentially, ecological sustainability needs to go hand in hand with 
social justice and in this regard the question arises as to what (parts of the economy and 
social system) shall grow for that objective and what parts should rather shrink.1 
 
To get there, a number of analysts favour an alternative regulation of capitalism (capitalism 
3.0), which overcomes its neo-liberal phase. An accumulation regime with a strong social-
ecological thrust should lead to a boost of eco-technological solutions, reduce rates of profit, 
overcome the alienation of finance capital from the real economy and pay greater attention to 
a regional focus of supply chains (Adler and Schachtschneider, 2010: 159). For this 
objective, the following directions (or rather aspirations) for development are proposed 
(Loske, 2011: 20-54):  
 
▬  Giving up the extreme fixation on GDP as central indicator of welfare by differently 
valuing productive and reproductive performance, including at family level, 
voluntary activities and in the informal sector.2  
▬ Checking the all-too-embracing trends of commercialization of human activities and 
nature services. 
▬ Development of new work and living models that reduce the growth of labour 
productivity and cut the working time. 
▬ Reorientation of companies on quality- and less on price-focused competition. 
Companies should find ways of extracting value from longer-lived goods, from 
services built around the performance of their goods rather than their sale, and 
from reselling and recycling their materials and components (Nair, 2011: 135). 
▬ Development of a taxing regime that discourages striving towards higher physical 
production and profit and that improves income distribution (this should include 
                                                
1  In a recent report, even the World Bank emphasizes that “it is … critical to use the savings or 
new proceeds generated by climate policies to compensate poor people, promote poverty 
reduction, and boost safety nets (World Bank, 2015: 16).   
2  Some alternative indicators already exist, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, the Happy 
Planet Index or the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare. The latter, calculated for Germany 
for the period 1990 to 2009, for instance, showed an increase of 6%, whereas conventional GDP 
increased by 11%. While classical GDP contracted in the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Index 
of Sustainable Economic Welfare increased. For more information, see Hoffmann (2011: 11) and 
Pinzler (2013).  
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redirecting taxes from labour to material/energy/resource use, introducing pollution 
taxes and taxing financial speculation). 
▬ Stimulation of social and ecological innovation.  
▬ Providing incentives to develop and maintain public goods and services. 
▬ Regionalization of supply chains. Re-adaptation of economic activities to local and 
regional resources.  
▬ Increasing the room for public and common property, including sharing 
property/economy elements. 
▬ Reform of the monetary system so that money is only created and put into 
circulation by central banks, which would avoid the detachment of the monetary 
system from the real economy.  
▬ Reform of the rules governing international trade and foreign direct investment so 
that regionalization of economic activity is not jeopardized and a race to the bottom 
for ecological and social standards avoided.  
 
 
The key question related to the proposed directions in the bullets above is: how can they 
really be translated into practice? Their implementation would challenge many well-
established and vested power interests and positions, which are unlikely to give up their 
influence without resistance. Some issues are bordering on systemic changes, for which 
sufficient societal or political support needs to be created. Furthermore, some new ‘post-
growth’ elements, such as the sharing economy, might run the risk of being undermined by 
vested interests of large companies.1 In sum, under prevailing circumstances and the current 
political system, some of the flagged directions are only likely to be conceivable as a result of 
severe or frequently reoccurring crisis and catastrophic situations2 and related public 
pressure for change.  
                                                
1  There are already the contours of serious conflicts in the ‘sharing economy’. Large internet 
platforms for taxi or hotel/guest room services, for instance, are increasingly dominating the 
business and encourage expansion of the use of such services, leading to increased, rather than 
reduced material and energy consumption. Furthermore, there is the risk that these internet 
platforms create precarious working or contractual conditions and challenge basic requirements 
of public safety (for more information, see Loske, 2014).   
2  The word ‘catastrophe’ is of Greek origin (katastrophé). It means ‘a drastic turnaround’. In other 
words, a catastrophic situation might also offer opportunities for change. Examples of such 
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On a somewhat less pessimistic note, as emphasized by Randers (2012), some recent 
projections on population and consumption growth might suggest a less dynamic 
development of the world economy and a resulting less dramatic global warming trend. 
Randers, for instance, projects that world population might peak at roughly 8 billion people in 
2040 and be in decline by 2050.1 Furthermore, the workforce in developed countries will 
decrease and rich countries will hardly grow on a per capita basis over the next 40 years. As 
a result, the world economy might not be 4 times as big in 2050 as it is today, but only 2 
times. Moreover, although global GDP will double, global society may be forced to spend so 
much labour and capital on repair and adaptation that global consumption would level off 
before the middle of the century.2 As a consequence, Randers projects CO2 emissions that 
might limit temperature increase to 3-4 degrees by the end of the century.3         
 
Some scientists pin a lot of hope on new technologies for directly removing CO2 from the air. 
Most of these technologies are producing methane, methanol, plastic and foam material. Yet 
all these technologies are very energy-intensive and would require a considerable part of the 
globally generated renewable energy. What is more, the produced fuel through these 
technologies would be eventually consumed and re-generate a considerable part of the 
carbon emissions removed from the atmosphere before. Estimates suggest that about 2 
billion tons of CO2 could thus be removed from the atmosphere annually, i.e. equivalent to 
some 6% of annual global CO2 emissions. In other words, these new technologies will 
remain far from playing a pivotal role in mitigating climate change (for a review, see 
Schramm, 2014: 37-38).    
 
                                                                                                                                                     
‘crisis’ or ‘catastrophic’ situations are severe floods, extremely strong tropical storms or severe 
draughts leading to drastic policy measures or changes in approach.         
1  This contrasts, however, with the rapid expansion of the so-called ‘middle class’, in particular in 
large rapid industrializing developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India and the ASEAN 
countries. The number of people with a per-capita income between US$6,000 and 30,000 in 
China and India alone is projected to double from roughly 800 million in 2010 to some 1.6 billion 
in 2020. These people have a high catch-up demand in terms of material, energy and emission-
intensive household appliances, vehicles and leisure activities. Such rapid expansion of the 
‘middle class’ is without a historic precedent. For more information, see: 
www.statetrust.com/page/en/BRICs-Middle-Class-Growth/0/247 and 
www.csmonitor.com/World/2011/0517/Surging-BRIC-middle-classes-are-eclipsing-global-
poverty.   
2  This will however also imply that most developing countries may have little prospect for 
economic and developmental catch-up with the North and that poverty levels largely remain 
unchanged. 
3  The downside of lower economic growth under the Randers scenario is that there will only be 
some 5 billion middle class people in the world by 2050, the rest of the population would be poor. 
It basically means that there would be more poverty than there would otherwise have been.    
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To wind up, a strategy of quantitative sufficiency is in blatant contradiction with the rules of 
prevailing capitalism that are based on cut-throat competition. Only if capitalism succeeds in 
(i) creating value while reducing the quantitative throughput (i.e. making profit from 
dematerialized activities and regeneration of resources) below planetary boundaries (and the 
reproductive capacity of our environment), and (ii) improving the socio-economic conditions 
for the majority of mankind will it have a chance of survival in the future.1 
 
From a more practical point of view, in the light of the above analysis and existing time 
constraints for mitigation, it seems logical that the pendulum of international attention should 
swing more towards effective adaptation and enhancing resilience to climate change in the 
next few decades. Many of the adaptation measures can be combined with mitigation. One 
should however not lose sight of the fact that a not unimportant part of the much-required 
adaption measures, such as the protection of coastal zones, river banks or adaptation in the 
building sector, are boosting economic activity and thus also GHG emissions. Yet, successful 
adaptation and enhanced resilience can effectively prevent and/or reduce damage, but it can 
most importantly protect and save human life. One needs to remember that the seriousness 
and scale of the forthcoming climate change challenge is new to mankind, but not to our 
planet and its wildlife, when those species and animals survived climate extremes that 
proved best adapted and most resilient.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1  The approach of Bhutan on making public happiness the principal objective of the economy and 
development process of the country (including the complete conversion of energy generation to 
renewable sources, a matching of energy supply and demand at regional level, the full 
conversion of agriculture to organic production, the taming of the expansion of the financial 
sector, as well as the ban on advertising for boosting private consumption) is an interesting 
example. In this way, the country currently seems to be the only one that has a determined 
strategy to break the logic and neck of growth fetichism.     
2  For more information, see: The Prince of Wales et al., 2010. 
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